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I. INTRODUCTION
In October of 2000, Henar Plaza-Torres was excited to begin a teaching career
with Petra Roman Vigo School in Puerto Rico as a junior-high school mathematics
teacher.1 A mere four months later, in February of 2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres resigned
because she could not endure the continuous sexual harassment by two of her
students.2 Ms. Plaza-Torres had reported the incidents of sexual harassment to her
school administration over a two month period, but the school refused to exercise its
authority to discipline the students and prevent their continued misbehavior.3 Ms.
Plaza-Torres filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in Puerto Rico, which
alleged that the school lacked an anti-harassment policy to adequately address
student-on-teacher sexual harassment, and that certain school officials failed to take
appropriate remedial measures to correct the sexual harassment and hostile work
environment that led to her constructive discharge.4
Ms. Plaza-Torres is not alone. Unfortunately, specific studies on the prevalence
of sexual harassment of teachers by students are limited due to the relatively recent
recognition of the problem. By analogy, however, studies that indicate that respect
for authority is declining among teenagers provide helpful indications of possible
causes of the problem.5 For example, one study conducted in 1997 revealed that six
percent of elementary school teachers, twenty-three percent of middle school
teachers, and twenty percent of high school teachers reported experiencing verbal
abuse from students.6 Another study conducted in 1999 revealed that “19 [sic]
percent of [United States] public schools reported weekly student acts of disrespect
for teachers.”7 Even these statistics may not accurately represent the rate of student-

1

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.P.R. 2005).

2

Id. at 175, 177.

3

Id. at 184.

4

Id. at 175.

5

Terry Nihart et al., Kids, Cops, Parents and Teachers: Exploring Juvenile Attitudes
Toward Authority Figures, 6 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 79, 80-81 (2005); see also John O’Neil,
Cover Story: Classroom Management, NAT’L EDUC. ASSN., Jan. 2004, http://www.nea.org/
neatoday/0401/cover.html (noting that public attitudes have consistently identified lack of
discipline as one of the top concerns facing schools since 1969 when Phi Delta Kappa first
began conducting its annual Gallop poll of public attitudes toward schools).
6

Ethics Resource Center, Statistics: Discipline Issues, http://www.ethics.org/
character/stats_discipline.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (reporting the results of a 1997
study on school violence, which was conducted with a nationally represented sample of 1234
regular public elementary, middle, and secondary schools in the fifty states and the District of
Columbia).
7

AND

JILL F. DEVOE ET AL., U.S. DEP’TS OF EDUC. & JUSTICE, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME
SAFETY: 2005 at v (2005), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/iscs05ex.pdf; see also
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on-teacher harassment, as teachers may underreport harassment in order to preserve
their dignity and their jobs.8
Despite the prevalence of student harassment against teachers, many school
administrators disregard teacher complaints. Inaction rarely has legal repercussions
for schools or their administrators.9 As a result, administrators do not feel obligated
to take action against student perpetrators to remove sexual harassment from the
work environment of their teachers. When school districts refuse to take appropriate
action to protect their teachers from sexual harassment perpetrated by their students,
teachers are forced to choose between their economic well-being and their emotional
well-being.10
In the past, courts have been reluctant to hold schools accountable for student-onteacher sexual harassment. The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled
on the issue of school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.11 As a
result, teachers who have been sexually harassed by their students and who have
brought claims against their schools for failure to intervene have struggled to survive
summary judgment and, as a result, school districts avoid legal liability.12 There is

NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., INDICATORS
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators.

OF

SCHOOL CRIME

AND

SAFETY (2005),

8

The author bases this assumption on the apparent similarity between student-on-teacher
sexual harassment and rape in terms of the victim’s reluctance to report out of embarrassment
and fear. Rape is “the most underreported violent crime in America” because victims fear
police response, minimize the importance of reporting, discredit the possibility of a favorable
outcome, or prefer to protect their own privacy. Rape Trauma Services, Rape and Sexual
Assault: The Demographics of Rape, http://www.rapetraumaservices.org/rape-sexualassault.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (citing D.G. KILPATRICK, ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992)) (emphasis omitted).
9
Note that the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue to establish a cause
of action for teachers to assert against a school. Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180. As a
result, many jurisdictions have been unwilling to recognize a teacher’s cause of action and
complaints filed by victimized teachers are often dismissed on summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 192 F. Supp. 2d 100, 113-14 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
10

See PEGGY CRULL, WORKING WOMEN'S INST., THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
A PROFILE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF 92 WOMEN 4 (1979) (indicating that psychological
symptoms, including fear, anger, and nervousness, affect ninety-six percent of harassment
victims); see also Jennifer L. Vinciguerra, Note, The Present State of Sexual Harassment Law:
Perpetuating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Sexually Harassed Women, 42 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 301, 306 & n.39 (1994) (citing CRULL, supra note 10).
THE JOB:

11

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (“[N]either the U.S. Supreme Court nor the First
Circuit Court have discussed school liability for sexual harassment suffered by a teacher on
account of a student . . . .”); Paul Lannon, School May Be Liable for Student-on-Teacher
Harassment, Holland & Knight LLP, http://www.hklaw.com/Publications/OtherPublication.
asp?ArticleID=3245, (last visited Nov. 23, 2007).
12
In order for a court to grant summary judgment as a matter of law, the moving party
must prove two elements: namely, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the
evidence would lead reasonable minds to but one conclusion in favor of the moving party.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986); see also
Seils, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 110, 127 (granting summary judgment in favor of school district).
But see Owen v. L’Anse Area Schs., No. 2:00-CV-71, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19287, at *10
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some evidence, however, that the tides are shifting. Recent court treatment of
student-on-teacher harassment indicates that the courts may be more receptive to
teachers’ claims of sexual harassment by students.13
A split has emerged among the lower federal courts that have faced the issue of
school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Some jurisdictions
continue to refuse to recognize a teacher's cause of action against a school that fails
to prevent student-on-teacher sexual harassment.14 Recently, however, the precedent
for analogous claims by public employees against their employers for employment
discrimination based on sex has solidified; as a result, jurisdictions seem to be
increasingly willing to recognize a cause of action against school districts in their
capacity as a public employer for failure to intervene in acts of student-on-teacher
sexual harassment.15 These jurisdictions have found that teachers who experience
employment discrimination may bring their cause of action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”),16 which prohibits discrimination in the
workplace based on sex, as well as race, color, religion, or national origin,17 or Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”),18 which prohibits sex
discrimination in schools that receive federal funding.19 Most recently, in July of
2005, the United States District Court of Puerto Rico held for the first time that a
teacher—Ms. Plaza-Torres—could bring a cause of action, under either Title VII or

(W.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2001) (denying summary judgment for Title VII discrimination claim
on appeal).
13

Lannon, supra note 11.

14

Seils, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 118.

15

See, e.g., Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
that a cause of action, under the Equal Protection Clause, against a school for sexual
orientation harassment of a teacher by students may exist).
16

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).

17

Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 6, 2001) (recognizing a cause of action under Title VII against the school for race and
national origin harassment of teacher by students; denying defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, in order to give plaintiff the opportunity to establish for a jury that a “hostile
environment existed and . . . that the school board either provided no reasonable avenue of
complaint or knew of the harassment and failed to take appropriate remedial action”). For
cases that have recognized a cause of action for student-on-teacher harassment in alternative
contexts, see Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 956 (recognizing a cause of action under the Equal
Protection Clause for sexual orientation harassment of a teacher by students, although the
claim was not proper in this case); Lovell v. Comsewogue Sch. Dist., 214 F. Supp. 2d 319,
323 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that plaintiff stated a cognizable cause of action under the Equal
Protection Clause against the school district for failing to take appropriate measures to prevent
sexual orientation harassment by students).
18

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).

19

N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 530 (1982) (extending Title IX to protect
employees of educational institutions from sex discrimination); see also Plaza-Torres v. Rey,
376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 179 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Title IX . . . provides protection from sex
discrimination in employment.”); see also Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
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Title IX, against a school district that refused to take action to prevent sexual
harassment perpetrated by students.20
It is essential to the safety and protection of our nation’s educators that schools
adopt preventative and corrective measures to stop student-on-teacher sexual
harassment. Schools should consider developing training programs devoted to
educating the school community, revising current anti-harassment policies to
explicitly prohibit student-on-teacher sexual harassment, and establishing effective
complaint procedures to help victimized teachers report incidents of sexual
harassment. By taking these proactive measures, schools will prepare themselves for
the potential liability suggested by recent case law.
This Note urges all school districts to take proactive measures to end sexual
harassment of teachers by students. Additionally, it urges state legislatures to pass
legislation mandating school adoption of anti-harassment policies that include
provisions prohibiting all forms of student-on-teacher harassment, including sexual
harassment. Following this introduction, Part II of this Note provides a background
on the current climate in the public schools in the United States, identifies the
statutory protections available to victims of sexual harassment, and discusses the
definitions of sexual harassment used by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and the courts. Part III examines relevant sexual harassment
decisions in the school environment, as well as analogous sexual harassment
decisions in the employment context. Part IV explores the court’s analysis in PlazaTorres v. Rey21 and considers the policy rationales for imposing liability on schools
that refuse to intervene in incidents of student-on-teacher harassment. Part V of this
Note recommends that school districts revise their existing anti-harassment policies
and develop proactive training programs directed at teachers, students, parents, and
the entire school community to prohibit student-on-teacher harassment effectively,
increase awareness of the problem, and emphasize a commitment to strict
disciplinary action for offenders. Finally, Part VI concludes that elimination of
student-on-teacher sexual harassment will require proactive school administrations
that are interested in both taking the requisite steps to protect teachers from student
harassment and avoiding costly legal liability that could result from their inaction.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Climate of U.S. Schools
Disrespect and disorder are increasingly common problems facing teachers in
schools in the United States.22 Teachers constantly struggle to maintain order in their
classrooms and authority over their students.23 The concerns teachers face in the

20

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180-81.

21

Id. at 180-84.

22

Mary Ellen Flannery, The D Word: Discipline Problems Weigh on Educators Today
More than ever. But Don’t Despair—there’s Plenty You Can Do to Knock Your Challenges
Down to Size, NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, Sept. 2005, http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0509/
coverstory.html (“[S]urvey found 82 percent of adults agree kids are less respectful.”).
23

O’Neil, supra note 5.
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classroom today are quite different from fifty years ago.24 Students today become
violent with their classmates25 and verbally or physically attack their teachers.26 In
1999, Reb Bradley suggested that children lack the discipline and self-control
necessary for learning in the classroom because parents no longer take the time to
teach self-control to their children.27 Instead of teaching self-control and self-denial,28
parents focus on being popular with their children.29 Parents are intimidated by their
children and distracted by work and other commitments, and, as a result, children run
the homes.30 Not surprisingly, these children expect to run their classrooms as well.31
Consequently, conflict and tension between teachers and students arise in the
classroom and pose problems for schoolteachers.
Students lack the respect for teachers, parents, and other authority figures that
society once expected and enforced.32 Some blame the decline in respectful behavior
on violent television programs, movies, and videogames.33 Others blame weak gun
laws,34 increased work commitments,35 or lack of after-school programs.36 Still others
24
Nancy A. Braun et al., Establishing a Descriptive Database for Teachers with
Aggressive Students, 8 J. BEHAV. EDUC. 457, 457 (1998) (noting the shift in the last halfcentury in social issues that concern families, schools, and communities, including increased
“poverty, suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, divorce, child abuse, weapon use, and gang
involvement”).
25

Flannery, supra note 22; see also DEVOE ET AL., supra note 7 at vi (“In 2003, 12 percent
of students ages 12–18 reported that someone at school had used hate-related words against
them. . . [and] 7 percent of students ages 12–18 reported that they had been bullied . . . at
school during the previous 6 months.”).
26

Flannery, supra note 22; see also DEVOE ET AL., supra note 7 at v (“In 1999–2000, 19
percent of public schools reported weekly student acts of disrespect for teachers, 13 percent
reported student verbal abuse of teachers, 3 percent reported student racial tensions, and 3
percent reported widespread disorder in classrooms.”).
27
Reb Bradley, What’s Happened to America? The Ultimate Answer, WORLD NET DAILY,
June 1, 1999, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=16149 (“Until
parents get the vision for teaching their children to be self-controlled, America will continue
its downward slide into the moral cesspool.”).
28
Self-denial refers to “practicing self discipline” and “controlling . . . impulses.” WordNet
3.0, http://wordnet.princeton.edu (last visited Oct. 28, 2007); see also Dictionary.com,
http://www.dictionary.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2007) (Defining self-denial as “[s]acrifice of
one’s own desires or interests.”).
29

Bradley, supra note 27.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Braun, supra note 24, at 458 (“Major concerns listed in the 1940’s [sic] included talking
without permission, chewing gum in class, making noises, running in the hallway, getting out
of line, wearing improper clothing, and not putting paper in the wastebasket.”).
33

Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U.
L. REV. 1487, 1487 (1995); see also Bradley, supra note 27.
34

Bradley, supra note 27.

35

New America Found., Workforce and Family Program, http://www.new
america.net/programs/workforce_and_family (last visited Apr. 21, 2007) (“Nearly two-thirds

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/9

6

2007]

OVERCOMING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

583

blame inadequate school funding, which leads to larger school buildings, larger
classes, and higher student-to-teacher ratios.37 Regardless of the actual cause of the
increase in violence and disrespect among students, alleviating the problem of
student disrespect will necessitate dedication and effort from the entire school
community—teachers, administrators, parents, coaches, and students.
In the 1980s, people began to recognize sexual harassment as a form of student
disrespect.38 In 1998, the National Education Association (“NEA”)39 recognized
sexual harassment and other acts of disrespect in the classroom and posted twentyfive classroom management tips on their website to help teachers regain control.40
Efforts like these are a good start toward prevention; however, violent and
disrespectful behavior, including sexual harassment, will continue to plague the
schools until school administrators make it a priority to consistently exercise their
heightened authority over students who have sexually harassed their teachers.41
B. Statutory Protections
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 as amended in 1991,43 forbids
employment discrimination based on an “individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
of families are now headed by either two working parents or a single working parent.”); see
also Parents Action for Children, Key Facts about Child Care in America,
http://www.parentsaction.org/act/childcare/key-facts/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
36
Kevin P. Dwyer, Children Killing Children: Strategies to Prevent Youth Violence,
COMMUNIQUE: NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. PSYCHOLOGIST, Spring 1999, at 3, http://www.
naspcenter.org/pdf/bbcqcrisisfamily.pdf.
37

Public Agenda, Public Agenda Report: Sizing Things Up – What Parents, Teachers, and
Students Think About Large and Small High Schools, http://www.publicagenda.org/
specials/smallschools/smallschools.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
38

Pam Chamberlain, 66 RADICAL TCHR. 32, 32 (2003) (book review) (“[S]exual
harassment became recognized as prevalent in schools in the 1980s.”).
39

National Education Association, About NEA, http://www.nea.org/aboutnea/index.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2006). “The National Education Association (NEA), the nation's largest
professional employee organization, is committed to advancing the cause of public education.
NEA's 3.2 million members work at every level of education—from pre-school to university
graduate programs. NEA has affiliate organizations in every state and in more than 14,000
local communities across the United States.” Id.
40

Flannery, supra note 22 (suggesting the following tips for educators: modeling desired
behavior, setting parameters, avoiding confrontation, keeping students busy, creating more
interesting lesson plans, ignoring excuses, going on home visits, ensuring that students and
parents understand the rules and expectations, and finding the triggers); see also O’Neil, supra
note 5 (indicating that teachers who are experts in managing behavior in today’s classrooms
establish effective rules and procedures, create a supportive classroom environment, build
strong relationships with parents and students, handle disruptions quietly while traveling the
room, and are flexible).
41

Chamberlain, supra note 38 (“Schools tend to treat the problem [of sexual harassment in
schools], however, as something to be hidden, a secret.”).
42

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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national origin.”44 Title VII purports to achieve equality and remove barriers in
employment.45 The prohibition against sex discrimination means that an employee
may not be discriminated against because of sex.46 Title VII applies to all employers
with fifteen or more employees—including school systems—to ensure that
employees are protected from sex discrimination in the workplace.47
Courts have not always interpreted Title VII to protect employees from sexual
harassment. Prior to the 1980s, many courts refused to recognize sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination.48 Then, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,49 the
United States Supreme Court established that sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination and, therefore, a violation of Title VII.50

43
For a discussion of the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on sexual harassment, see,
for example, Edward J. Costello, Jr., Note, Sexual Harassment After the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 23 UWLA L. REV. 21 (1992).
44

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The statute states, in pertinent part, that it is “an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. Importantly, “[i]ts original purpose as a civil
rights measure was to outlaw racial segregation. Sex, as a category, was added at the last
minute as an amendment in a cynical attempt to defeat the bill altogether.” PAUL I. WEIZER,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CASES, CASE STUDIES, & COMMENTARY 151 (David A. Schultz ed.,
2002) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Even so, “sex-based criteria
have developed into one of the most litigated parts of the civil rights agenda.” Id.
45

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees.”).
46

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).

47

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Title VII’s absolute ban
of sex discrimination . . . is binding for all employers, regardless of whether their employer
receives federal funding.”); see Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay
Harassment as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 189 (2005); see also Staci D. Lowell, Note, Striking a Balance: Finding a Place for
Religious Conscience Clauses in Contraceptive Equity Legislation, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 441,
464 (2004-2005) (“Title VII . . . applies to employers with over 15 employees . . . .”).
48
ROBERT BELTON ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 443 (7th ed. 2004). But see Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing sexual harassment as a cognizable cause of action under
Title VII).
49

477 U.S. 57 (1986).

50

Id. at 65; see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (recognizing a
cause of action for a discriminatory work environment for the first time); EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006).
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2. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,51 amended in 1990,52 states in
pertinent part that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education[al] program or activity receiving [f]ederal
financial assistance.”53 Title IX seeks to prevent educational institutions from using
federal funds to support discriminatory practices.54 Thus, in order to meet its
purpose of protecting individuals from discrimination in schools, Title IX's express
prohibition against discriminatory practices applies to sex discrimination occurring
in federally-funded schools.55
Originally, courts interpreted Title IX narrowly as a measure intended to protect
students against sex discrimination at school.56 Then, in 1982, in North Haven Board
of Education v. Bell, the United States Supreme Court extended the application of
Title IX to provide protection to employees of federally-funded schools from
employment discrimination.57 In North Haven,58 the Court examined the broad
language of the statute, particularly the meaning of “person.”59 The Court also
explored the legislative history of Title IX60 to ultimately conclude that Title IX
prohibits employment discrimination based on sex under any federally-funded
education program or activity.61
C. Sexual Harassment: Definition and Types
1. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
One form of sexual harassment is quid pro quo harassment.62 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment is the classic form of sexual harassment under Title VII.63 Quid

51

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).

52

Vanessa H. Eisemann, Protecting the Kids in the Hall: Using Title IX to Stop Studenton-Student Anti-Gay Harassment, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 128 (2000).
53

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

54

Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63 & n.1 (1992).

55

Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); U.S. Dept. of Just., Title IX Legal
Manual (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/coord/ixlegal.htm
56
See, e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Title VII is
the exclusive remedy available for an employee of a federally-funded educational institution
who alleges sex discrimination).
57

N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 (1982).

58

Id.

59

Id. at 516, 520.

60

Id. at 522.

61

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2000); N. Haven, 456 U.S. at 537.

62

Paula N. Rubin, Civil Rights and Criminal Justice: Primer on Sexual Harassment, in
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANALYSES 1, 3 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2001).
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pro quo sexual harassment generally refers to carried-out threats64 by “an individual
[who] explicitly or implicitly conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job
detriment upon an employee’s acceptance of sexual conduct.”65 To be actionable,
quid pro quo sexual harassment requires that the employee experience an economic
impact.66 Employers will be subject to liability under a vicarious liability theory if
the sexual harassment is perpetrated by an individual with control over the victim,
such as a supervisor. Application of this theory to student-on-teacher sexual
harassment would be difficult because it would require students to have the power
and ability to impose economic consequences on their teachers; this is unlikely even
in schools with the most uninvolved administrations.
2. Hostile-Work-Environment Sexual Harassment
The second form of sexual harassment is hostile-work-environment harassment.67
Hostile-work-environment sexual harassment refers to “conduct [that] has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”68 The
definition of hostile-work-environment sexual harassment applies to harassment that
occurs in a school, office, or other type of workplace.69
In order for an individual to have a cause of action for hostile-work-environment
sexual harassment, the “workplace . . . [must be] permeated with [discrimination] . . .
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.’”70 Over the years, the
courts have further clarified what acts may constitute a hostile work environment.
First, a hostile work environment usually requires more than casual or isolated
63

Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 663 (D.D.C. 1976) (recognizing, for the first time,
a cause of action under Title VII for sexual harassment); BELTON, supra note 48, at 443.
64
Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) (“Cases based on threats which
are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo [sic] cases . . . .”).
65

Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).

66

Rubin, supra note 62, at 3.

67

WEIZER, supra note 44, at 151. This form of sexual harassment is “more problematic”
for employers. Id.
68

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2006);
see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that a hostile work
environment exists when the “workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
69

Latosha Higgins, Note & Comments, Lack of Knowledge of Sexual Harassment Shields
School Districts from Employer Liability under Title IX Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 317, 319 (1999) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Schs., 510 U.S. 60, 75 (1992)).
70

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted). Note that “[s]o long as the environment would
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, . . . there is no need for it also
to be psychologically injurious.” Id. at 22 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
67 (1986)).
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incidents.71 Second, hostile-work-environment sexual harassment requires that the
conduct be “severe or pervasive.”72 Third, a single act alone will generally be
insufficient to prove the existence of a hostile environment.73 Lastly, the conduct
must be both subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive such that it alters the
conditions of employment and creates an abusive working environment.74
Several characteristics distinguish hostile-work-environment sexual harassment
from quid pro quo sexual harassment. Unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment, where
the harasser imposes conditions on the victim’s job in order to receive sexual
benefits,75 hostile-work-environment sexual harassment refers to harassing conduct
that creates a work environment for the employee that is so unbearable that it hinders
the victim’s work performance.76 In addition, hostile-work-environment sexual
harassment does not require that the victim suffer an economic impact in order to be
actionable.77 Moreover, the conduct does not have to be sexual in nature78 or even
directed specifically at the victim so long as the conduct is based on the victim’s sex
and affects the victim’s ability to perform the job.79 Further, while quid pro quo
71
BELTON, supra note 48, at 457. See, e.g., Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d
265, 273 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir.
2000); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657, 675 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that single
proposition was not sufficiently severe to create hostile environment sexual harassment). But
see Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 812 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that two
incidents were sufficient to survive summary judgment); Quantock v. Shared Marketing
Servs., 312 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that three propositions at the same business
meeting were sufficiently severe for sexual harassment claim to survive summary judgment).
72

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”).
73

Id.; see also WEIZER, supra note 44, at 157 (“[W]hile no single factor will be a clear
indication of a hostile environment, a lack of any tangible harm will not by itself sink a sexual
harassment claim.”).
74

Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”).
75

Rubin, supra note 62, at 3.

76

Susan L. Webb, The History of Sexual Harrassment on the Job, in ISSUES AND ANSWERS
136, 139 (Linda LeMoncheck & James P. Sterba, eds., 2001) (“[H]ostile environment sexual
harassment, as defined by the courts, is . . . unwelcome and demeaning sexually related
behavior that creates an intimidating, hostile, and offensive work environment.”) (emphasis
omitted); see also WEIZER, supra note 44, at 152 (describing hostile environment harassment
as including a “workplace [that] is so polluted with discrimination that it makes the
environment of the employment setting hostile or intimidating.”); Rubin, supra note 62, at 4;
Karen J. Lewis & Jon O. Shimabukuro, Sex Discrimination and the United States Supreme
Court: Recent Developments in the Law, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: ISSUES AND ANALYSES 82,
92 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2001).
77

Rubin, supra note 62, at 4.

78

Id. at 4 (“Hostile work environment harassment . . . can include hostile or offensive
behavior based on the person’s sex.”).
79

Id. at 5.
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sexual harassment is limited to supervisors and authority figures,80 hostile-workenvironment sexual harassment may be committed by co-workers or even third
parties,81 such as students.82
Courts apply “hostile-work-environment” analysis to sexual harassment claims
brought under either Title VII or Title IX.83 The courts also employ virtually the
same sexual harassment definitions to resolve sexual harassment claims brought
under Title VII or Title IX.84 One distinction, however, is the applicable vicarious
liability theory. Under Title VII, a negligence standard determines whether an
employer will be subject to vicarious liability. Under Title IX claims, on the other
hand, a federally funded school will be subject to vicarious liability if the school
demonstrated “actual [notice] . . . and . . . deliberate[] indifferen[ce].”85
3. Sexual Harassment in School Settings
The U.S. Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have handed down case
precedent that confirms the applicability of “hostile-work-environment” analysis to
the harassment of employees by co-workers or third parties.86 These decisions did
not specifically involve school employees. The willingness of courts to extend Title
IX to apply to school employees is just one indication that it will become
80

Id. at 4.

81

Id.

82

See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006).
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or
its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases the
Commission will consider the extent of the employer’s control and any other legal
responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such nonemployees.
Id.; Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 183 (D.P.R. 2005) (“[I]t is clear that
the term ‘non-employee,’ as defined in the EEOC Guidelines, does not exclude students,
especially if the Court finds that a school has control and legal responsibility over student
misconduct.”). For further support that, in the instance of student-on-teacher harassment,
students fall under the classification of third-parties or non-employees, see generally Joanna L.
Routh, The $100,000 Kiss: What Constitutes Peer Sexual Harassment for Schoolchildren
Under the Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ. Holding? 28 J.L. & EDUC. 619, 622 (1999)
(“Students are a non-employee, non-agent third party.”).
83
Vickie J. Brady, Case Note, Borrowing Standards to Fit the Title—Do They
Really Fit? Title VII Standards Applied in Title IX Educational Sexual Harassment
Claim as the Conflict Among the Courts Continues. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch.
Dist., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996), 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 411, 412 (1998) (“The Kinman
court clearly borrowed principles and authority from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
to set [the] standard under Title IX.”).
84

U.S. Dept. of Just., supra note 55.

85

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); see also
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
86

Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
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increasingly difficult for school districts, as employers, to escape liability for
student-on-teacher sexual harassment.
In the context of student-on-teacher sexual harassment, Title VII may protect
teachers who, as employees, experience a hostile-work-environment created by
students if the student conduct is so subjectively and objectively severe or pervasive
that it alters the conditions of employment and creates an abusive working
environment.87 Similarly, Title IX may subject federally-funded school districts to
vicarious liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment because Title IX
prohibits “discrimination under any education[al] program or activity receiving
[f]ederal financial assistance.”88 Whether the cause of action is brought under Title
VII or Title IX, courts will likely use hostile-work-environment sexual harassment
theory, rather than quid pro quo sexual harassment theory, because hostile work
environment sexual harassment analysis does not require that the victim suffer an
economic impact, that the conduct is sexual in nature, or that the conduct is imposed
by supervisors or authority figures.89
4. Administrative Guidelines
In 1980, the EEOC90 established sexual harassment guidelines that apply to
sexual harassment claims under Title VII.91 The EEOC’s Guidelines92 (“Guidelines”)
define sexual harassment as “‘[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.’”93 The Guidelines
prohibit unwelcome sexual advances as a condition for a job benefit.94 In addition,
the Guidelines prohibit unwelcome conduct with “the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an

87
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993); BELTON, supra note 48, at 455
(“Harris v. Forklift requires a plaintiff to satisfy both an objective and subjective test in
proving that sexual harassment was sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive’ to affect ‘the conditions
of the victim’s employment.’”).
88

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).

89

See supra notes 81-87.

90

The EEOC is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
has five commissioners and a General Counsel appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate . . . . The five-member Commission makes equal employment
opportunity policy and approves most litigation. The General Counsel is responsible
for conducting EEOC enforcement litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), the Equal Pay Act (EPA), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/commission.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2006).
91
Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1980).
92

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).

93

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1980)).
94

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
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intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.'”95 The prohibitions the
EEOC promulgated in the Guidelines have become an important stepping stone in
the development of case law interpreting Title VII claims.
5. Court Adoption of the EEOC Guidelines
In the 1980 EEOC Guidelines, the EEOC distinguished between quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment. Federal courts relied on these categories of
sexual harassment in their subsequent interpretation of Title VII. Henson v. City of
Dundee96 is recognized as one of the first federal circuit cases to adopt the two forms
of sexual harassment contained in the EEOC Guidelines.97 In Henson, the plaintiff
brought suit against her supervisor, alleging that his daily inquiries about her and her
female coworker’s sexual habits created a hostile work environment.98 In holding for
the plaintiff, the Henson court relied on the EEOC’s Guidelines and identified quid
pro quo sexual harassment99 and hostile-work-environment sexual harassment100 as
the two forms that sexual harassment can take.
95

Id.

96

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).

97

Id. at 911.

98

Id. at 899.

99

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining quid pro quo sexual
harassment as “[s]exual harassment in which the satisfaction of a sexual demand is used as the
basis of an employment decision.”). Note that the definition of quid pro quo is “something for
something.” Id. at 1282. For a more detailed discussion of quid pro quo harassment, see, e.g.,
M. David Alexander et al., Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, in 70 THE PRINCIPAL’S
LEGAL HANDBOOK 317, 319 (Kenneth E. Lane et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005); see also JAMIN B.
RASKIN, WE THE STUDENTS: SUPREME COURT CASES FOR AND ABOUT STUDENTS 203 (2d ed.
2003) (explaining quid pro quo harassment in the context of teacher-on-student sexual
harassment under Title IX); Webb, supra note 76 at 138-39.
Quid pro quo (“this for that”) harassment, as defined by the courts, encompasses
all situations in which submission to sexually harassing conduct is made a term or
condition of employment or in which submission to or rejection of sexually harassing
conduct is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting the individual who is
the target of such conduct.
Id. at 138; WEIZER, supra note 44, at 151 (defining quid pro quo harassment as
“something for something, such as an employer demanding sex in exchange for a job or
promotion.”); Rubin, supra note 62, at 3 (“Quid pro quo harassment. . . . occurs when an
employee is required to choose between submitting to sexual advances or losing a tangible job
benefit.”); Lewis, supra note 76, at 92 (observing that quid pro quo harassment “occurs when
submission to unwelcome sexual advances or other conduct of a sexual nature is made a
condition of an individual’s employment or is otherwise used as the basis for employment
decisions.”).
100

See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (following the
EEOC guidelines promulgated in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 in holding that sexual harassment is
established with respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment “where an
employer created or condoned a substantially discriminatory work environment, regardless of
whether the [plaintiff] lost any tangible job benefits.”). For the definition of hostile-workenvironment harassment see, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment as “[s]exual harassment in which a work
environment is created where an employee is subject to unwelcome verbal or physical sexual
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In 1986, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, which followed Henson and recognized the two types of sexual
harassment found in the EEOC Guidelines.101 In Meritor, a supervisor at Meritor
Savings Bank made sexual advances toward Vinson, the plaintiff.102 The Supreme
Court determined that the focus in any hostile-work-environment harassment claim
should be “whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual
advances were unwelcome.”103 In finding that the supervisor intimidated Vinson into
having sexual intercourse with him forty to fifty times over a period of four years,104
the Supreme Court held that “an employee’s coerced participation in a sexual
relation creates a hostile environment[]”105 and ruled that Vinson had been the victim
of hostile-work-environment sexual harassment.106
Over the decades following Meritor, the United States Supreme Court continued
its struggle to clarify the definitions and appropriate standards to apply to both quid
pro quo and hostile-work-environment sexual harassment claims.107 Today, most
courts begin their analysis by identifying the type of sexual harassment at issue.
Identification is important because quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile-workenvironment sexual harassment require the plaintiff to prove different elements108 to
establish a prima facie case.109 For both types of sexual harassment claims, courts
behavior that is either severe or pervasive.”); Alexander, supra note 99, at 319; RASKIN, supra
note 99, at 203 (applying the definition of hostile-work-environment to teacher-on-student
harassment under Title IX); Webb, supra note 76, at 139; WEIZER, supra note 44, at 152;
Rubin, supra note 62, at 4; Lewis, supra note 76, at 92.
101

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Alexander, supra note 99, at

319.
102

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.

103

Id. at 68.

104

Id. at 60.

105

Alexander, supra note 99, at 319.

106

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.

107

Id. at 65. Note that the definition of sexual harassment in Title VII is borrowed by
courts in interpreting other statutes, such as Title IX. Brady, supra note 83, at 412.
108
In a hostile-work-environment case, the plaintiff must prove that “the conduct was
unwelcome[,] . . . was severe, pervasive, and regarded by the claimant as so hostile or
offensive as to alter his or her conditions of employment . . . [and] was such that a reasonable
person would find it hostile or offensive.” Rubin, supra note 62, at 5. Alternatively, proving
quid pro quo harassment requires that “[t]he harassment was based on sex . . . [and] [t]he
claimant was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances.” Id. at 3-4. Note that the former
requirement that the plaintiff also suffer “loss of a tangible job benefit” became inoperative
after Meritor. Id. at 4; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57-58.
109

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982) (establishing the
elements of a prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim). The Henson court
defined the elements as:
(1) [t]he employee belongs to a protected [class]. . . [;] (2) [t]he employee was
subject[ed] to unwelcome sexual harassment . . .[;] (3) [t]he harassment was based
[on] sex . . .[;] (4) [t]he harassment . . . affected a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of
employment . . .[; and] (5) [that the doctrine of] [r]espondeat superior [applies].
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will decide whether the defendant’s conduct was unwelcome110 and will examine the
“‘totality of the circumstances[]’”111 to determine whether or not sexual harassment
occurred.112
D. Sexual Harassment Laws: Application to Student-on-Teacher Harassment
Although Title VII is meant to protect all employees from workplace
harassment,113 many courts still refuse to recognize a cause of action under Title VII
by teachers sexually harassed by their students. Only recently have any courts been
willing to recognize that a harassed teacher, as a school employee, may have a valid
cause of action under Title VII against the school for its failure to intervene to
protect its employees from student harassment.114 As a result, schools often remain
free from legal liability,115 even though courts readily impose vicarious liability on
employers in non-school contexts for sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees.116 Given that courts have extended the application of Title VII to apply to
all employers in order to meet fully the statute’s purpose,117 schools face an increased
risk of liability for failing to act when students harass their teachers.
The United States Supreme Court has held employers liable under Title VII for
most sexual harassment that arises in the workplace, including harassment by
individuals in non-supervisory positions. For example, the Supreme Court has
recognized employer liability for co-worker harassment.118 When claims arise based
Id. See BELTON, supra note 48, at 453. The focus of this Note, school district
liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment, requires analysis under hostile-workenvironment sexual harassment.
110
Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing the Supreme
Court’s holding in Meritor); see also BELTON, supra note 48, at 453.
111

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).

112

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2006);
see Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993); see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998) (reaffirming the importance of focusing on the “surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships”); Williams v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 187 F.3d
553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999) (using the “totality of the circumstances” term of art that the EEOC
introduced).
113

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005).

114

Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that,
although the former teacher brought his claim under § 1983, the school district could be liable
to plaintiff under a negligence theory if the claim had been brought under Title VII). Note that
in this case the students subjected Schroeder to harassment based on his sexual orientation. Id.
at 948.
115
Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has
not directly ruled on this issue).
116

See, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D. Nev.

1992).
117

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180.

118

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 776 (1998) (“[T]he lower courts, [have]
uniformly judg[ed] employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard . .
. .”). But see Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988) (indicating that the
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on co-worker-on-employee sexual harassment, courts apply the negligence standard
to determine whether the employer should be held liable.119 Further, although the
United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on employer liability for
harassment of employees by non-employees, the lower federal courts have
recognized a cause of action under Title VII for non-employee-on-employee sexual
harassment,120 such as sexual harassment of an employee by a customer.121 These
courts have uniformly applied the negligence standard to determine an employer’s
liability under Title VII for non-employee-on-employee sexual harassment.122
Further, the EEOC Guidelines have designated the negligence standard as the
appropriate standard by which to establish employer liability for sexual harassment
of employees by non-employees.123
III. WHERE WE ARE TODAY
The United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue of school
district liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.124 There has not been a
direct ruling on this issue by the lower federal courts either.125 Even so, schools
should be aware that, in light of recent case law, the Supreme Court could recognize
such a claim.
Given the present uncertainty in the law, school districts do not have a clear
understanding of the extent of their legal responsibility, if any, to intervene when a
teacher is sexually harassed by students. As a result, many schools exert minimal
effort to prevent or stop this form of sexual harassment.126 Based on recent court
appropriate standard under Title IX is deliberate indifference). Note, however, that the U.S.
Supreme Court has not directly ruled on employer liability for co-worker-on-employee sexual
harassment.
119

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799-800. The negligence standard is applied to co-worker
harassment claims instead of the vicarious liability standard on the rationale that employers do
not give co-workers as much control over the harassed employee as supervisors. Id.
120

See, e.g., Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 854 (1st Cir. 1998);
Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
121

Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).

122

See Rodriguez-Hernandez, 132 F.3d at 854.
[A]n employer is held responsible for “the acts of sexual harassment towards his
employees in the workplace by persons not employed by him if the employer or his
agents or supervisors knew or should have known of such conduct and did not take
immediate and adequate action to correct the situation.”
Id. (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 155f (1995)); see also Plaza-Torres, 376 F.
Supp. 2d at 181; Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1073; Erickson v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 2d
709, 726 (W.D.Wis. 2005).
123

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006).

124
See Mark Walsh, High Court Declines Case on Harassment of Gay Teacher, 22 EDUC.
WK., Oct. 30, 2002, at 28 (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari for a claim
of student-on-teacher sexual orientation harassment).
125

Lannon, supra note 11.

126

Chamberlain, supra note 38, at 32; see also Alan Dessoff, Harassed Teacher Wins in
Court of Last Resort, 40 DISTRICT ADMIN. 50 available at http://www.district
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treatment of this and related issues, however, school districts might not remain
liability-free for long. Recent decisions suggest that courts may be willing to extend
both Title VII and Title IX to allow teachers to bring lawsuits against their schools
for student-on-teacher sexual harassment. To avoid costly litigation, school districts
should become familiar with the decisions that suggest the potential for liability for
student-on-teacher sexual harassment and pay particular attention to the standard
under which they may become liable.
Schools may soon be subject to liability under Title VII or Title IX for failure to
intervene in incidences of student-on-teacher sexual harassment.127 As discussed
earlier, Title VII is a federal statute that applies to all employers with fifteen or more
employees to prohibit sex discrimination in the workplace.128 School liability for
student-on-teacher sexual harassment may arise under Title VII based on the
willingness of courts to recognize an employee’s cause of action against an employer
for sexual harassment by an individual who is not employed by the defendant
employer.129 Additionally, schools may become subject to liability for student-onteacher sexual harassment under Title IX, a federal statute that prohibits sex
discrimination under federally-funded school programs and activities,130 based on the
United States Supreme Court’s recognition of school liability under Title IX for both
teacher-on-student and student-on-student sexual harassment.131
A. Employers May Be Liable for Non-Employee-on-Employee Sexual Harassment
Employers may be liable under Title VII for failing to intervene in incidences of
hostile-work-environment sexual harassment perpetrated by non-employees against
employees.132 The EEOC Guidelines recognize employer liability in this situation if
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
appropriate action to prevent or correct it.133 To determine the appropriateness of
administration.com/viewarticle.aspx?articleid=597 (recognizing the abuse that teachers endure
by reporting the experience of a teacher who filed suit because her school administration tried
to minimize the situation and refused to take action to prevent her continued harassment by
students).
127

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005).

128

Id.; see also Weiner, supra note 47, at 189.

129

See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1073 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n
employer may be found liable for the harassing conduct of its customers.”); see also Turnbull
v. Topeka State Hosp., 255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff doctor had a
cause of action against her employer hospital for sexual harassment committed by a patient).
130

See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).

131

Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (student-on-student
harassment); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (teacher-on-student
harassment).
132

See generally Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of
Employees by Non-employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable? 21 PEPP. L. REV.
447 (1994).
133

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2006)
(“An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its agents or supervisory

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/9

18

2007]

OVERCOMING A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

595

imposing liability, the EEOC Guidelines recommend an inquiry into the employer’s
level of control or legal responsibility over the non-employee.134
When the lower federal courts first began ruling on employer liability for the
harassment of employees by non-employees, they followed the EEOC Guidelines to
determine whether the employer should be held liable for the actions of nonemployees. For example, in Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.,135 the District Court
relied on the EEOC Guidelines136 to hold, in a case of first impression, that a casino
could be held liable under Title VII for the sexual harassment of a dealer by
gamblers “in the appropriate case.”137 The circuit courts quickly followed the district
court’s lead and adopted the EEOC’s formulation for handling this issue. For
example, in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,138 the Tenth Circuit held that an employer
could be liable for negligently ignoring a waitress’s complaints of harassment from
her customers.139
Over the years, the circuit courts began to emphasize the level of control or legal
responsibility that the employer had over the non-employee and the work
environment when determining whether to impute liability.140 In Crist v. Focus
Homes, Inc.,141 employees who worked at a private residential facility for autistic
individuals were assaulted by their patients.142 In holding that the employer failed to
properly respond, the Eighth Circuit focused on the employer’s ability to control the
environment to determine the appropriateness of finding the employer liable for the
harassment.143 Also, in Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital,144 the Tenth Circuit
emphasized the employer’s control over the work environment to hold the state
mental hospital liable for the sexual assault of a psychologist by a patient.145
Today, an employer may be held vicariously liable for a hostile-workenvironment created by non-employees if the employer had the requisite level of
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action.”).
134

Id.

135

841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992). Note that the court was ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 1025.
136

Id. at 1027-28.

137

Id. at 1028.

138

162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998).

139

Id. at 1072.

140

Undoubtedly, this is also in reliance on the EEOC Guidelines. 29 CFR § 1604.11(e)
(1985) (“In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect to the
conduct of such non-employees.”).
141

122 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1997).

142

Id. at 1108.

143

Id. at 1112.

144

255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001).

145

Id. at 1244.
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control or legal responsibility over the non-employee and failed to act “in accordance
with its statutory duty not to discriminate in the workplace.”146 The negligence
standard remains the accepted standard by which courts determine whether or not the
employer should be held liable under Title VII for failing to prevent sexual
harassment of its employees by non-employees.147 Indeed, “the focus in a ‘failure to
prevent’ situation . . . should be on the employer’s knowledge of the harassment, the
employer’s ability to end or prevent it and the “adequacy of the employer’s remedial
and preventative responses.”148
Courts readily apply Title VII’s prohibition against sexual harassment in the
workplace to protect school employees.149 For example, courts recognize that Title
VII protects school employees against harassment by a coworker150 or supervisor.151
As discussed earlier, Title VII applies to all employers, whether public or private, to
ensure that employees are protected against various forms of discrimination,
including sex discrimination,152 no matter the perpetrator.153 In fact, courts have now
begun to extend Title VII to impose a duty on schools to protect all of their
employees, including teachers, from harassment by non-employees, such as
students.154 As a result, school districts should anticipate eventual uniform extension
of Title VII to school liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment.
B. Schools May Be Liable for Teacher-on-Student Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX, schools may be held liable for teacher-on-student sexual
harassment. In 1998, the United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of
imposing liability on a school for failing to prevent or respond to harassment of
students by teachers when it decided Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District.155 In Gebser, a high school teacher, Frank Waldrop, in the Lago Vista
146

Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1020 (5th Cir. 1996).

147

See Erickson v. Wis. Dept. of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 2d 709, 727 (W.D. Wis. 2005)
(“[D]efendant’s liability for failing to prevent plaintiff from being sexually harassed should be
governed by the negligence standard . . . .”).
148

Id. (quoting Turnbull, 255 F.3d at 1244).

149

See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 (1982).

150

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 799 (1998) (recognizing uniform
treatment by the lower courts of co-worker-on-employee harassment under the negligence
standard of liability).
151

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at
780 (holding that an employer is vicariously liable for sexual harassment of an employee by a
supervisor). Further, the Faragher court recognized the employer’s affirmative defenses that
it acted reasonably and the employee acted unreasonably if the harassment did not create a
tangible employment action. Id. at 807.
152

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).

153

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (indicating that the
actions of supervisors, coworkers, “or even strangers to the workplace” can create a hostile
environment for an employee).
154

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 180 (D.P.R. 2005).

155

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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Independent School District made sexually suggestive comments to students in his
book discussion group.156 Mr. Waldrop began directing these comments specifically
to the plaintiff, an eighth-grader who joined the teacher’s book discussion group.157
Mr. Waldrop eventually initiated sexual contact with the student, and ultimately
engaged in sexual intercourse with her over a period of months.158 The student failed
to report the teacher’s inappropriate conduct to school officials, and the contact
continued until the two were caught by a police officer.159 When the student brought
suit under Title IX against the school district, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that a cause of action could arise in this situation, but that school officials
with authority to end the sexual harassment must have actual notice of the
harassment and act with deliberate indifference before the school would be held
liable for the teacher’s harassing conduct.160
C. Schools May Be Liable for Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment
Under Title IX, schools may be held liable for student-on-student sexual
harassment as well. Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school could be
liable for teacher-on-student harassment in certain circumstances, it held that a
school could be liable for student-on-student sexual harassment. In Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,161 fifth-grader LaShonda Davis endured sexually
harassing comments from one of her peers over a period of five months.162 Despite
the efforts of LaShonda and her mom to notify teachers and school officials of the
inappropriate behavior, the school never disciplined the other student.163 The
Supreme Court ruled that the school district would be liable for the sexual
harassment of LaShonda by her peer only if “the funding recipient acts with
deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment . . . that [are] so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that [they] effectively bar[] the victim’s access
to an educational opportunity or benefit.”164 As in Gebser,165 the Supreme Court held
156

Id. at 277-78.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 278.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 290.
[A] damages remedy will not lie under Title IX unless an official who at a
minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures on the recipient’s behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the
recipient’s programs and fails to adequately respond.
. . . [M]oreover . . . the response must amount to deliberate indifference to
discrimination.
Id.

161

Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).

162

Id. at 633-34.

163

Id,

164

Id. at 633.

165

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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in Davis that a school is liable for student-on-student sexual harassment if it knew
about the harassment and acted with deliberate indifference.166 In its decision, the
Supreme Court imposed a duty on schools to take appropriate remedial action to
promptly stop sexual harassment among students.167
D. Schools May Be Liable for Student-on-Teacher Harassment
Teachers bringing sexual harassment claims based on harassment by students
have struggled to overcome certain obstacles. In one case, a school was not held
liable because it took prompt remedial action to end the harassment of the teacher by
students.168 In doing so, the court found that the school district demonstrated that it
did not act unreasonably by either negligently refusing to protect its teachers169 or by
acting with deliberate indifference to known instances of student harassment of
teachers.170 In another case, the court held that the school was not liable because the
harassing conduct perpetrated by the students did not rise to a level sufficient to
constitute hostile-work-environment sexual harassment.171
Recently, the District Court of Puerto Rico denied summary judgment to the
defendants in a student-on-teacher sexual harassment claim brought under Title VII.
The plaintiff, Henar Plaza-Torres, was a school teacher at Petra Roman Vigo School
from October 2000 until February 2001.172 Two students, Johnny Davila and Angel
Vera, made sexually suggestive comments to Ms. Plaza-Torres.173 Ms. Plaza-Torres
began reporting the harassing conduct to Ms. Evelyn Matos, the Mathematics
Supervisor for the school district, in November or December of 2000, and met with
the Discipline Committee to discuss Johnny Davila’s conduct.174 Nevertheless, the
harassment continued with no intervention by the school district.175 In February of
2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres resigned, and stated that she felt intimidated by the students’
comments.176 On August 8, 2001, Ms. Plaza-Torres filed a charge of discrimination
with the EEOC to bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim against the former
166
Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. Specifically, the court held that a school may be liable under
Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment if the school “acts with deliberate
indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities . . . [and the] harassment
. . . is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access
to an educational opportunity or benefit.” Id.
167

Id.

168

See, e.g., Warnock v. Archer, 380 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that the
school district took the requisite prompt remedial action to avoid liability for student-onteacher harassment).
169

Recall that this is the Title VII standard. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.

170

Recall that this is the Title IX standard. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.

171

See, e.g., Seils v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 192 F. Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).

172

Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177 (D.P.R. 2005).

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

Id. at 175.

176

Id. at 177.
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Secretary of the Department of Education, as well as the School Director of Petra
Roman Vigo School, the Department of Education, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico.177
Although the ruling of the United States District Court of Puerto Rico is not
binding on other jurisdictions, its reasoning may be useful to other courts faced with
the issue of student-on-teacher sexual harassment. In denying defendants’ motions
for summary judgment, the Plaza-Torres court acknowledged that “neither the U.S.
Supreme Court nor the First Circuit Court have discussed school liability for sexual
harassment suffered by a teacher on account of a student.”178 The court then
concluded that “a cause of action for student-on-teacher sexual harassment may be
inferred from recent Title VII, Equal Protection and Title IX case law.”179
1. Plaza-Torres Analysis
180

Plaza-Torres v. Rey provided the United States District Court of Puerto Rico
with the first opportunity to address the issue of school liability for student-onteacher sexual harassment.181 In July of 2005, the District Court denied the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, and held that an “employee of an
educational institution, who has suffered sex discrimination [during] employment,
may file a cause of action under Title VII or Title IX.”182 This holding means that
teachers, as employees of an educational institution, may bring a cause of action
against their school district under either Title VII or Title IX for sexual harassment, a
form of sex discrimination,183 perpetrated by students. The court proceeded to
analyze the case under Title VII, the statutory basis asserted by the plaintiff.184 The
court reasoned that Title VII’s prohibition against “unlawful employment practices,
based upon a person’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin[,]”185 applies to all
employers, including schools.186 In dicta, the court carefully considered
congressional intent and concluded that Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination
by any educational program or activity receiving federal funds covers employment

177

Id. at 175, 177.

178

Id. at 180.

179

Id.

180

Id. at 171.

181

Alex Londono, Costly Crushes: Student-on-Teacher Sexual Harassment, EDUC. LAB.
LETTER, Nov. 2005, at 4, available at http://laborlawyers.com/showarticle.
aspx?Type=1119&ArticleType=-1&NewsLetterType=3388&Show=3954.
182

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 180.

183

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2006);
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (“[I]n 1980[,] the EEOC issued
Guidelines specifying that ‘sexual harassment’ . . . is a form of sex discrimination prohibited
by Title VII.”).
184

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 179-80, 180 & n.3.

185

Id. at 178 (citing Provencher v. CVS Pharm., 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1998)).

186

Id. at 179.
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discrimination, such as sexual harassment, by educational institutions receiving
federal funds.187
In Plaza-Torres,188 the District Court also determined the standard for assessing
school district liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment claims brought
under Title VII. To reach the proper standard, the district court reviewed the law
governing supervisor-on-employee,189 co-worker-on-employee,190 and nonemployee-on-employee191 sexual harassment claims and ultimately held that the
negligence standard that courts apply to non-employee-on-employee sexual
harassment claims would be the appropriate standard to apply to student-on-teacher
sexual harassment claims brought under Title VII.192
The Plaza-Torres court provided persuasive support for its decision to adopt the
negligence standard to resolve the issue of school liability for student-on-teacher
sexual harassment. The court relied in part on the standard adopted by Peries v. New
York City Board of Education,193 in which a teacher’s Title VII claim against the
school district for harassment by students based on race and national origin survived
summary judgment.194 Relying on prior relevant case law that had addressed
employer liability for harassment of employees in non-school settings, the Peries
court concluded that “it is difficult to conceive of a test more appropriate for studenton-teacher harassment than that suggested for customer harassment.”195 Customeron-employee, or non-employee-on-employee, harassment uses the negligence
standard to determine whether to impose liability on the employer.196
The court relied on the general rule that “[a]n employer’s liability for hostile
[work] environment sexual harassment depends on the relationship between the
employer and the person responsible for the sexual harassment.”197 The Plaza-Torres
court applied this general rule to the situation of student-on-teacher sexual
187

Id. at 180; see also N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 520-21 (1982); Davis
v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (interpreting Title IX as a prohibition of
hostile-work-environment harassment in cases involving employees of educational
institutions).
188

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 171.

189

Id. at 181.

190

Id.

191

Id.

192

Id. at 183.

193

Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
6, 2001).
194

Id. at *5-6.

195

Id. at *6.

196
Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(e)).
197

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (citing Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power
Breakers, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D.P.R. 2002)); see also Molina Quintero, F. Supp.
2d at 112. For a discussion of the relationship between the employer and the harasser in terms
of the agency relationship, see, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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harassment and determined that resolution of the issue of school liability for studenton-teacher sexual harassment necessarily requires that fact finders look at the
relationship between the school officials and the student or students responsible for
the sexual harassment.198 Hence, the Plaza-Torres court clarifies that fact finders
should look at the relationship between the school officials and the students to
determine the school’s level of control over the students responsible for the sexual
harassment of its employees.199
Although the Plaza-Torres court specified negligence as the appropriate standard
for determining whether a school district should be held liable, as an employer, for
failing to prevent student-on-teacher sexual harassment under Title VII, it did not
address the appropriate standard for resolving the issue under Title IX.200 The
standard for determining a school’s liability for student-on-teacher sexual harassment
under Title IX likely differs from the Title VII standard. Had the court considered
this issue, it likely would have concluded that the school must have had actual notice
of the harassment201 and acted “deliberately indifferent”202 to be subject to liability.
Relevant case law has ruled that, in order to establish school liability for the
harassing conduct of its students or teachers under Title IX, the school must have had
actual notice of the harassment203 and acted “deliberately indifferent.”204 While
Plaza-Torres is not binding on other jurisdictions of the United States,205 as the most
recent case on point, this decision is instructive to school districts seeking to
understand their legal responsibility and avoid potential liability.
2. Policy Considerations
Courts often rely on policy considerations when deciding questions of law. There
are strong policy rationales for imposing liability on schools for student-on-teacher
sexual harassment, including the public interest in school safety, teacher safety, and
order in the classroom. Further, the government has a strong interest in preventing an
“unpleasant, unproductive work atmosphere.”206 The disruption that student-on198

Plaza-Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183.

199

Id.

200

Id. at 180 (“Plaintiff s[ought] relief under Title VII[] . . . .”).

201

Id. at 183; Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2001); Lipsett v. Univ. of P. R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988).
202

See Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 2002).

203

Plaza Torres, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 183; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 901.

204

Schroeder, 282 F.3d at 951 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446,
454 (7th Cir. 1996), in holding that, to survive summary judgment, plaintiff “must show that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants ‘acted either intentionally
or with deliberate indifference’”).
205
HELENE S. SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 10 (rev. 4th ed. 2003)
(“Precedent becomes ‘binding authority’ on a court if the precedent case was decided by that
court or a higher court in the same jurisdiction.”) In addition, “[t]he decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States are binding on all courts in all jurisdictions for matters of
constitutional and other federal law.” Id. at 12.
206

Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979).
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teacher sexual harassment creates should motivate schools to take action to prevent
and correct student-on-teacher harassment.
Student-on-teacher sexual harassment has far-reaching effects. It is upsetting to
the victims who must endure the treatment as part of the work environment. Other
students also suffer because a victimized teacher is unable to teach as effectively as a
teacher in a harassment-free environment.207 The students who remain free to harass
their teachers may not learn to treat authority figures with respect. Student-onteacher sexual harassment is a distraction to students in the United States schools.
Without proper intervention now, student-on-teacher sexual harassment will further
impair our nation’s ability to educate its young people effectively.
School officials with the power to control the behavior of students should
intervene to stop student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Courts already realize that
“as a general rule, school administrators and school board officials have disciplinary
authority that exceeds that of a classroom teacher.”208 School officials have the
power to use their heightened authority to impose disciplinary sanctions to stop the
behavior of student harassers and set an example for other students, thereby creating
safer schools overall.209
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made to school boards in anticipation of
increased court willingness to extend precedent and impose liability on schools for
student-on-teacher sexual harassment. School districts should revise their current
anti-harassment policies to explicitly prohibit student-on-teacher sexual harassment,
establish effective complaint procedures to help victims report incidents of sexual
harassment, and develop training programs to educate the entire school community
on the school’s stance against sexual harassment.210 In addition, states should adopt
legislation to mandate that school policies include a clear prohibition specifically
directed against student-on-teacher sexual harassment.
A. Revise School Anti-Harassment Policies
Currently, many school districts fail to include student-on-teacher sexual
harassment in their anti-harassment policies. The EEOC Guidelines recommend that
all employers “take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing
appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise
207

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (“Without first establishing
discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”).
208
Peries v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., No. 97 CV 7109, 2001 WL 1328921, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 6, 2001) (recognizing that school officials have heightened authority over students as
compared to the authority of classroom teachers); see also Howard v. Bd. of Educ. of
Sycamore Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 893 F.Supp. 808, 819 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“[T]he principal, is in
a unique position to . . . control the behavior of students. . . . [H]e has a responsibility to the
teachers . . . in his role as chief administrator of the school.”).
209
See The Principals’ Partnership, Research Brief: Teacher Intimidation by Students,
http://www.principalspartnership.com/teacherintimidation.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
210

Inspired by the National Education
resolution/heres-I51.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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the issue of harassment under title VII [sic], and developing methods to sensitize all
concerned.”211 Studies show that anti-harassment policies are effective at reducing
the incidents of student harassment of teachers.212 Since courts look to the EEOC
Guidelines to determine employer liability,213 schools should establish antiharassment policies with prohibitions against all forms of sexual harassment.214
The new policies that schools adopt should include clear prohibitions against
sexual harassment of teachers by students. To comply with the EEOC’s
recommendations, schools that rely on model policies created by governmental
entities need to be careful to ensure that the model policy reflects a strong stance
against student-on-teacher sexual harassment. Some model policies fail to do so. For
example, the Department of Education provided an Arizona Sample Policy, prepared
by the Office of the Attorney General, which provided that “[i]t shall be a violation
of District policy for any student, teacher, administrator, or other school personnel of
this District to harass a student through conduct of a sexual nature, or regarding race,
color, national origin or disability, as defined by this policy.”215 This policy is
problematic today, in light of the implications of Plaza-Torres,216 because it fails to
ban harassment of teachers and other school employees by students. Schools can
increase the effectiveness of their anti-harassment policies in several ways. First,
schools can modify the language of the policy so it resembles the language of the
Minnesota Sample School Board Policy:
It shall be a violation of this policy for any pupil, teacher, administrator or
other school personnel of the School District to harass a pupil, teacher,
administrator or other school personnel through conduct or
communication of a sexual nature or regarding religion and race as
defined by this policy. (For purposes of this policy, school personnel
includes school board members, school employees, agents, volunteers,

211

EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2006);
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of
Sexual Harassment, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2006).
212

See The Principals’ Partnership, supra note 209.

213

Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
214
AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND. SEXUAL HARASSMENT TASK FORCE,
HARASSMENT-FREE HALLWAYS: HOW TO STOP SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOL: A GUIDE FOR
STUDENTS, PARENTS, AND SCHOOLS 22 (Susan K. Dyer ed., 2004), available at
http://www.aauw.org/research/upload/completeguide.pdf. [hereinafter SEXUAL HARASSMENT
TASK FORCE] .
215

Department of Education, Protecting Students from Harassment and Hate Crime: A
Guide for Schools – January 1999 Appendix A: Sample School Policies 57, available at
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/AppA.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Appendix A].
216

See Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.P.R. 2005).
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contractors or persons subject to the supervision and control of the
District.)217
Second, schools should include in the anti-harassment policy specific complaint
procedures available to victims. These complaint procedures should outline the
process of investigation that the school will follow upon receipt of a complaint and
specify clear expectations as well as disciplinary consequences for perpetrators.218
Finally, schools should place the anti-harassment policy in the school handbook to
assure distribution of the policy to students, parents, school employees, and other
members of the school community.
B. Develop Proactive Training Programs for School Communities
Establishing clear anti-harassment provisions that prohibit student-on-teacher
sexual harassment is important, but is usually not enough. School districts must
“spur changes in behavior and not just policy[]”219 by developing proactive training
programs for the entire school community. Some schools already use training
programs to address other common school problems. For example, the Steps to
Respect bullying-prevention program,220 Bully Busters,221 and the Olweus Bully
Prevention Program model222 address bullying behavior. Similarly, the Second Step
violence-prevention program223 deals with violence. Schools can adapt these or
similar programs to specifically address sexual harassment of teachers by students.
C. State Legislation
Some states have enacted laws that require school districts to adopt anti-sexual
harassment policies.224 For example, North Carolina passed legislation, effective July
217

Appendix A, supra note 215, at 63 (providing the Minnesota Sample School Board
Policy Prohibiting Harassment and Violence, as prepared by the Minnesota School Boards
Association).
218

See SEXUAL HARASSMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 214, at 17-19.

219

AM. ASS’N. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: BULLYING,
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Committee for Children Homepage, http://www.cfchildren.org/cfc/strf/str/strindex (last
visited Feb. 12, 2006).
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Olweus Bullying Prevention Program, http://www.clemson.edu/olweus (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006).
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1, 2001, to address harassment of school employees.225 The statute provides that
“[e]ach local board of education may adopt a policy addressing the sexual
harassment of . . . employees by students.”226 To afford school employees necessary
protection, all state legislatures should follow the example of North Carolina. For
even greater protection, legislation should mandate adoption of such a policy, instead
of merely allowing for its adoption.
V. CONCLUSION
Students often test the boundaries of appropriate behavior. Disorder ensues in the
schools when authority figures refuse to correct student misbehavior. Schools should
not be complacent about this problem. Recent cases suggest that courts are
increasingly willing to hold schools liable for student-on-teacher harassment.
Student-on-teacher sexual harassment has a devastating impact on teachers, other
students, and society that will continue until school administrators with the power to
stop the harassment take action to do so. School districts should anticipate legal
liability and adopt proactive policies and programs to prevent and correct all forms
of sexual harassment, including student-on-teacher sexual harassment.
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N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-335.5 (West 2005).

226

Id. § 115C - 335.5.
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